We show how labelled deductive systems can be combined with a logical framework to provide a natural deduction implementation of a large and well-known class of propositional modal logics (including K, D, T, B, S4, S4:2, KD45, S5). Our approach is modular and based on a separation between a base logic and a labelling algebra, which interact through a xed interface. While the base logic stays xed, di erent modal logics are generated by plugging in appropriate algebras. This leads to a hierarchical structuring of modal logics with inheritance of theorems. Moreover, it allows modular correctness proofs, both with respect to soundness and completeness for semantics, and faithfulness and adequacy of the implementation. We also investigate the tradeo s in possible labelled presentations: we show that a narrow interface between the base logic and the labelling algebra supports modularity and provides an attractive proof-theory but limits the degree to which we can make use of extensions to the labelling algebra.
Introduction
In this paper we examine how two complementary proposals for dealing with the enormous range of logics developed in recent years combine together in practice. The rst is the use of a generic theorem prover 12, 13, 17] , based on a logical framework, which can be used to implement proof systems for many logics in a uniform manner. These theorem provers are based on a metalogic in which the syntax and proof rules of object logics are encoded, and theorems of the object logic are constructed by proving theorems in the metalogic. The second is that of a Labelled Deductive System (LDS, 10]), a method for giving uniform presentations of non-standard logics based on possibly radically di erent deductive systems, e.g. modal, substructural, or nonmonotonic logics. In the LDS approach, instead of a consequence relation being de ned over formulae (: : : A`B : : : ), it is de ned over pairs consisting of a label and Journal of Logic and Computation, 7(6):685-717, 1997; c Oxford University Press. a formula (: : : x:A`y:B : : : ). The labels then allow information needed to formalize the more subtle metatheoretic aspects of the relation to be tracked. For modal logic, for instance, we might want to distinguish between`local' (with respect to some world) and`global' (with respect to some frame) consequence, so the label could keep track of the`possible world' in which the formula lives. Or for a substructural logic, where the consequence relation should be sensitive to operations like weakening and contraction, the labels might track resources and their use 7] .
We study this combination in the case of propositional modal logics and show how it can provide a simple and usable implementation of a large collection of logics (including K, D, T, B, S4, S4:2, KD45, S5) in a natural deduction (ND, 18, 19] ) setting.
We view a proof system for an LDS as consisting of two parts: a base logic for manipulating labelled formulae, and a separate labelling algebra for reasoning about the labels. Our base logic, in which labels represent possible worlds in the Kripke frame, is a labelled ND presentation of propositional calculus extended with introduction and elimination rules for 2 (formalizing the modal logic K). Our labelling algebras are relational theories comprised of Horn clause axioms formalizing the accessibility of worlds in Kripke frames. These two parts are separate and communicate through an interface provided by the rules for 2. We implement these theories in the Isabelle logical framework 17] , and this separation is enforced by the use of multiple judgements (cf. 12]) in the metalogic, which distinguish between relational and labelled formulae.
Why Combine Paradigms?
Why should the LDS and logical framework paradigms be combined when logical frameworks themselves should su ce to formalize and implement logics? We contend, and we hope our development illustrates, that the combination is sensible and advantageous since each paradigm can provide something that the other lacks. On one hand, an LDS can help tailor the consequence relation of a logic to t better that of the metalogic. On the other, a logical framework provides a means of directly implementing certain kinds of LDS presentations (see discussion in Section 6.2) as ND proof systems, provides a concrete metalogic for reasoning about the correctness natural deduction presentations of modal logics; they have been developed and studied (e.g. 9, 18] ). The problem is that the resulting systems often require considerable ingenuity and the rules can be quite awkward. For instance in any ND presentation of a modal logic based on K, where we have ! I, we also are allowed to use the rule ?`A 2?`2A 2I ; where 2? indicates that each assumption in ? has 2 as its outermost connective.
The problem with this rule is that it is not pure: it carries a side condition on the complete set of assumptions. While logical frameworks work well in encoding certain kinds of rules, namely those rules of ordinary pure single-conclusioned ND systems 1 , the logical frameworks so far proposed are not able to formalize the above kind of impure side condition in a natural deduction setting and hence cannot directly formalize such presentations.
Since we cannot directly encode impure rules in a logical framework, it is di cult to build proof systems using ! I and 2I together. Of course, there may be other sets of proof rules, which are pure, that formalize the same logic. For example, a pure presentation of S4 for the Edinburgh LF logical framework can be found in 2, x4.4], where two judgements (true and valid) are used which, in essence, factor the proof system into two parts, in one of which only propositional reasoning is possible. While it may be possible to develop other presentations in this fashion, there does not appear to be a systematic way to do this; each new modal logic requires insight and its own justi cation of correctness. Further, even when given such presentations, we have no reason to expect them to have the same combinational properties as their corresponding Hilbert systems; i.e. given systems corresponding to K4 and KT (i.e. T), we do not know if their combination corresponds to KT4 (i.e. S4).
We show that the LDS approach can serve as a solution to this problem; for modal logics, it provides precisely what is needed, namely an ordinary, pure singleconclusioned natural deduction presentation. Moreover, the solution supports modularity since the labelling algebra directly expresses the properties of the appropriate Kripke frames.
Finding a`good' presentation
In order to provide an LDS formalization of a logic we need two things: a base logic, and a general notion of a labelling algebra. However, for each of these there may be more than one possible candidate. For instance in this paper we concentrate on labelling algebras corresponding to Horn theories of the accessibility relation, one possibility out of many, and not even perhaps the most obvious | why restrict ourselves to Horn clause logic, instead of full rst-order, or even higher-order, logic? Clearly we need some criteria for assessing the relative merits of the range of possibilities. We can, of course, consider the basic metatheoretic properties that any logical system is expected to satisfy, such as proof normalization, but we can extend this list. There are pragmatic considerations, such as`is it easy to use?'. But there are other theoretical considerations: for instance D'Agostino and Gabbay, in 7, p.244], write
The labelling algebra represents this metalevel information as a separate component of a standard derivation system and can be treated as an independent parameter. In the LDS approach, logical systems are not studied statically, in isolation, but dynamically, observing the process of their generation and their interaction (via modi cations of the labelling algebras) on the basis of a xed proof-theoretical hard core (the underlying system of deduction). their emphasis]
In other words, a good LDS presentation should correspond not just to some logic, but to a space of possible logics, which vary in a well-behaved way according to the details of the labelling algebra; e.g. we would expect that given an LDS for modal logic, a presentation of K4 combined with a presentation of T does result in S4. By this standard, for instance, while the presentation of S4 in 2] could be seen as an LDS where the two judgements correspond to labels, it would not be a good one, since there is no labelling algebra to vary. 2 The system we propose does well by these measures. It cleanly separates the labelling algebra from the base logic K, and we show that it has good modular, compositional properties for the labelling algebra, behaving in the way we would expect as we combine labelling algebras together, providing a natural hierarchy of systems that inherit theorems and derived rules. Although not formally quanti able, our experience shows that proof construction using this hierarchy is natural and intuitive. Moreover, we use the parameterized relational theory to prove a parameterized completeness theorem with respect to Kripke semantics, and to prove the correctness of the encodings. These theorems show that our implementation not only properly captures modal provability within our hierarchy, but also a satisfactory notion of proof under assumption, i.e. consequence.
We show that using our base logic K we are able to interpret the`separate' in the previous quotation in a strong way: not only do we have a separation between the base logic and the labelling algebra, but that separation is maintained even when building proofs; i.e. the proofs themselves consist of a derivation tree built from the base logic, which is decorated with a fringe of derivations in the labelling algebra alone. It turns out that this property is directly related to the behavior of falsum (?) in K, which is able to propagate between di erent worlds. We call this propagation property global falsum. We show that this is enough to implement, among others, the logics in the Geach hierarchy (including many of the modal logics we are likely to encounter in practice), but not enough to implement all modal logics with rst-order de nable frames.
Having identi ed this property of falsum, we can vary it to produce di erent candidate`hard cores'. We investigate the other two obvious possibilities. The rst of these, an extension we call universal falsum, allows ? to propagate not only from one world to another, but also between worlds and the labelling algebra (assuming that the labelling algebra is also extended with falsum). The second, a restriction where ? is no longer able to propagate even between worlds, we call local falsum.
A system with universal falsum is strictly more general than one with global falsum. In fact we show that it is essentially equivalent to a traditional semantic embedding in rst-order logic (cf. Section 4), and therefore able to treat not just, e.g., the Geach logics, but any rst-order axiomatizable theory. However in exchange for this greater scope we lose the better behaved proof theory of a system with global falsum, and the result does not seem to o er any advantages over semantic embedding in rst-order logic (where there is no separation at all), and thus provides no essential alternative to this better known approach. If we restrict ourselves to a local falsum on the other hand, the proof system is in general not suitable for formalizing modal logics, and proofs even no longer have normal forms. Thus K with global falsum seems to be the weakest base logic that we can extend to a useful range of modal logics.
Outline
In this paper we give a complete account of our work on labelled propositional modal logics, which supersedes earlier accounts in 3, 5] . In Section 2 we present a hierarchy of labelled propositional modal logics based on K and Horn relational theories. In Section 3 we show the soundness and completeness of these theories with respect to Kripke semantics. After, in Section 4, we consider some of the proof-theoretic properties of our encodings and use that to contrast our approach with related formalizations. In Section 5 we sketch our implementation in Isabelle, its application, and its correctness. In Section 6 we compare with related work based on natural deduction presentations of modal logics, LDS presentations, and translation into rst-order logic. Finally, we draw conclusions. An appendix contains proof scripts from an Isabelle session that demonstrate interactive proof construction with our implementation.
A Hierarchy of Labelled Modal Logics
We introduce a labelled ND system for the base modal logic K and extend it with (Horn) relational theories.
The Base Modal Logic K
De nition 1 Let W be a set of labels and R a binary relation over W. If x and y are labels, and A is a propositional modal formula built from ?, !, 2, 3, then x R y is a relational formula (rw ), and x:A is a labelled formula (lw ).
Hence, if p is a sentence letter, and A; B are propositional modal formulae, then x:p, x:?, x:A ! B, x:2A, x:3A are all lw s. Lw s over other connectives (e.g. :,^, _) can be de ned in the usual manner, e.g. x::A x:A ! ?. Henceforth, we assume that the variables x; y; z; w range over labels, the variables A; B range over propositional modal formulae, ' is an arbitrary rw or lw , and ? = fx 1 :A 1 ; : : : ; x n :A n g and = fx 1 R y 1 ; : : : ; x m R y m g are arbitrary sets of lw s and rw s. These may all be annotated with subscripts or superscripts.
The rules given in Figure 1 determine K, the base ND system which formalizes a labelled version of the modal logic K. In 2I, y is di erent from x and does not occur in any assumption on which y:A depends other than x R y. In 3E, y is di erent from x and z and does not occur in any assumption on which the upper occurrence of z:B depends other than y:A and x R y. We do not enforce Prawitz's side condition on ?E that A 6 = ?. 
Relational Theories
We will formalize particular modal logics by extending K with relational theories, which axiomatize properties of the accessibility relation R in Kripke frames. Correspondence theory 23, 24] provides a tool for telling us which modal axioms correspond to which axioms for R. For example, the T axiom, 2A ! A, corresponds to the rstorder axiom 8x(x R x). Not all modal axioms can be captured in a rst-order setting (e.g. the McKinsey axiom 23A ! 32A), so there is an important decision that we must make: Should we allow all higher-order relational theories, or some subset thereof? This decision is non-trivial. We show in Section 4 that di erent choices of interface between K and the labelling algebra result in essentially di erent systems. Our choice is based on our intention to implement these theories (Section 5.1) as sets of proof rules using a metalogic corresponding to minimal implicational predicate logic. Hence, we have chosen to admit precisely those theories of R that can be directly formulated in the Horn-fragment of this metalogic without requiring additional axioms (e.g. for auxiliary predicates) or judgements (e.g. for identity). We partially justify this choice below by showing that it captures a large class of well-known modal logics including most of those used in practice. A Horn relational theory T is a theory generated by a set of such rules.
Horn Relational Theories
In rst-order logic the addition of a Horn formula to a theory is equivalent to adding the corresponding rule; hence, in the context of our metatheories we shall talk about additions based on either formulae or rules as is convenient.
We now indicate that restricting our attention to Horn theories is often su cient in practice. Let i, j, m, and n be natural numbers, and let 2 n 3 n ] stand for a sequence of n consecutive 2s 3s]; for example 3 2 which corresponds to the semantic notion of (i; j; m; n) convergency (or`incestuality' in the terminology of 6])
8x8y8z(x R i y^x R j z ! 9u(y R m u^z R n u)) ; where x R 0 y means x = y and x R i+1 y means 9v(x R v^v R i y).
There are instances of (i; j; m; n) convergency that explicitly require the identity predicate, e.g. (1; 0; 0; 0) yields vacuity, 8x8y(x R y ! x = y). For simplicity, we do not consider theories with identity, and we introduce the subclass of restricted (i; j; m; n) convergency axioms as the class of properties of the accessibility relation that can be expressed as Horn rules in the theory of one binary predicate R. These theories yield, among others, most of the modal logics usually of actual interest (K, D, T, B, S4, S4:2, KD45, S5,: : : ). Proof The restriction that m = n = 0 implies i = j = 0 is a necessary and su cient condition for identity to be inessential (the necessity can be checked semantically), as noted in 22]. Now, for each convergency axiom A k in T G , let B k be formed by prenexing quanti ers followed by skolemizing remaining existential quanti ers. B k must be of the form: Some properties corresponding to instances of restricted (i; j; m; n) convergency are given in Figure 2 . We also present there the Horn relational rules that result from applying the above translation to these axioms, together with the corresponding characteristic axioms.
Various combinations of Horn relational rules de ne labelled equivalents of standard propositional modal logics: the logic L = K + T is obtained by extending K with a given Horn relational theory T . 3 Figure 3 shows a fragment of the resulting hierarchical dependency. For example, KT4 (S4) is obtained by extending K with the 3 We adopt the convention of naming the modal logic K+T as KAx, where Ax is a string consisting of the standard names of the characteristic axioms corresponding to the relational rules contained in T . As an example, KD, KT, KTB, KT4, KT5 identify the logics also known as D, T, B, S4, S5. Figure 3 : A hierarchy of modal logics (fragment) rules re and trans, or alternatively by extending either KT with trans or K4 with re .
Our approach of presenting logics by combinations of K with a relational theory T provides a general method for representing logics in a modular and transparent way. The relational theory can be viewed as an independent parameter: the base logic K stays xed for a given class of related logics and we generate the one we want by combining K with the appropriate relational theory. In Section 4, we return to the question of extensions to full rst-order or higher-order theories. It is possible to generalize our presentation here, but, perhaps surprisingly, for some extensions thè interface' between K and the relational theory must be changed if completeness for encoded logics (with respect to their intended Kripke semantics) is to be preserved, and the metatheoretic properties of the system change.
Derivations
We adapt the standard de nition of Prawitz 18 ] to de ne derivations of lw s and rw s relative to a given relational theory T used to extend K. De nition 5 A derivation of an lw or rw ' from a set of lw s ? and a set of rw s in a logic L = K + T is a tree formed using the rules in L, ending with ' and depending only on ? . We write ?; `L ' when ' can be so derived. A derivation of ' in L depending on the empty set,`L ', is a proof of ' in L, and we say that ' is an L-theorem.
Fact 6 When ' is an rw , say x R y, we have that
We also call a derivation proof] in a logic L an L-derivation L-proof ], and we will omit the`L' when the particular logic is not relevant. We systematically use , possibly annotated, to range over derivations, and we write ' to specify that the formula ' is the conclusion of the derivation . Similarly, we write ' or
h '] i to distinguish a possibly empty set of occurrences of the open or discharged assumption ' in . Moreover, we use superscripts to associate discharged assumptions with rule applications.
As an example, we give the K2-proof of the characteristic axiom corresponding to convergency, i.e.`K 2 x:32A ! 23A. By the induction hypotheses, 1`L x R y implies 1 j = x R y, and 2`L y R z implies 2 j = y R z. Assume j = ML . Then, from the induction hypotheses we obtain j = ML x R y and j = ML y R z, i.e. (x; y) 2 R L and (y; z) 2 R L . Since R L is transitive, we conclude j = ML x R z by De nition 9.
When Skolem constants are present, M L is a Skolem expansion; e.g. for convergency assume that R L is convergent and consider applications of the rules conv1 and By Proposition 4, the theory T H generated by conv1 and conv2 is a conservative extension of the rst-order theory T G corresponding to the convergency axiom. By Theorem 3.4.4.(ii) in 25, p.137], each model of the theory T G has a Skolem expansion, contained in M L , which is a model of T H . Assume j = ML . Then, from the induction hypotheses we obtain j = ML x R y and j = ML x R z, i.e. (x; y) 2 R L and (x; z) 2 R L . Since R L is convergent, we conclude j = ML y R g(x; y; z) and j = ML z R g(x; y; z) by De nition 9.
We prove (ii) by induction on the structure of the derivation of x:A from ? and . 1 ; j = y:?. We assume j = ML (?; ), and prove j = ML x:A. Since 6 j = ML y:? for any y, from the induction hypothesis we obtain 6 j = ML ? 1 , and therefore 6 j = ML fx:A ! ?g, i.e. j = ML x:A and 6 j = ML x:? by De nition 9.
Consider an application of the rule 2I
x R y] y:A x:2A 2I where is the derivation ?; 1`L y:A, with 1 = fx R yg. By the induction hypothesis, ?; 1`L y:A implies ?; 1 j = y:A. Assume j = ML (?; ). Considering the restriction on the application of 2I, we can extend to 0 = fx R zg for an arbitrary z 6 2 (?; ), and assume j = ML 0 . 4 Since j = ML 0 implies j = ML 1 , from the induction hypothesis we obtain j = ML y:A, that is j = ML z:A for an arbitrary z 6 2 (?; ) such that j = ML x R z. We conclude j = ML x:2A by De nition 9.
Consider an application of the rule 2E When the particular logic is not relevant, we will omit the`L' and simply speak of consistent and inconsistent pcs. In standard proofs for unlabelled modal logics the set W C L is obtained by progressively building maximally consistent sets of formulae, where consistency is locally checked within each set (cf. 6]). In our case, given the presence of labelled formulae and explicit assumptions on the relations between the labels, i.e. , we modify the Lindenbaum lemma (Lemma 15 below) to extend (?; ) to one single maximally consistent proof context (? ; ), where consistency is`globally' checked also against the additional assumptions in . The elements of W C L are then built by partitioning ? with respect to the labels, and accessibility is de ned by exploiting the information in . Moreover, in standard proofs the way in which W C L is built depends on the particular modal logic L, in particular on the accessibility conditions holding for L. In our case, the proof is completely independent of L: exactly the same procedure applies for any logic.
In the proof of the Lindenbaum lemma for rst-order logic a maximally consistent and !-complete set of formulae is inductively built by adding for every formula 9x:P(x) a witness to its truth, namely a formula P(c) for some new individual constant c. This ensures that if, for every closed term t, P(t) is contained in the set, then so is 8x:P(x). A similar procedure applies here in the case of lw s of the form x:3A. That is, together with x:3A we consistently add y:A and x R y for some new y, which acts as a witness world to the truth of x:3A. This ensures that the maximally consistent pc (? ; ) is such that if x R z 2 (? ; ) implies z:B 2 (? ; ) for every z, then x:2B 2 (? ; ), as shown in Lemma 16 below. Note that in the standard completeness proof for unlabelled modal logics, one shows instead that for every w 2 W C L , if 3A 2 w, then W C L also contains a world accessible from w that serves as a witness world to the truth of 3A.
Lemma 15 Every consistent pc (?; ) can be extended to a maximally consistent pc (? ; ).
Proof We rst extend the language of the logic L with in nitely many new constants for witness worlds. Systematically let w range over labels, v range over the new constants for witness worlds, and u range over both. All these may be subscripted. We would therefore be unable to prove completeness for rw s, since there would be cases, e.g. when L = K and = fg, where 6 L u i R u j but (u i ; u j ) 2 R C L , and thus j = M C L u i R u j . Hence, we instead de ne (u i ; u j ) 2 R C L i u i R u j 2 ; note that therefore u i R u j 2 implies fA j 2A 2 u i g u j . 6 Moreover, we immediately have 
A Topography of Labelled Modal Logics
We have given a particular presentation of (propositional) modal logics as Labelled Deductive Systems based on two separate parts: a base logic K, and Horn relational theories. Here we consider alternatives for de ning hierarchies of logics and classify them based on their metatheoretic properties. We organize this investigation around the interface between the two parts: since the rules for 2 and 3 cannot be sensibly changed, this amounts to studying how falsum (?) propagates between worlds. We show that this question directly relates to which kinds of relational theories we can formalize while retaining completeness.
We start in Section 4.1 with the base logic K we have developed above, where we have what we call global falsum: ? can propagate from one world to another (Fact 23).
We prove that this system preserves duality between 2 and 3 (Proposition 24) and that derivations have good normalization properties (Theorem 28) in comparison with what we get from semantic embedding (Fact 32 and Fact 34). Then we show that in exchange for these good properties, we cannot use K as a base to formalize all modal logics with rst-order axiomatizable frames (Theorem 33).
In Section 4.2 we consider what happens if we allow ? to propagate between base logic and labelling algebra in either direction. By doing this, we lose the good normalization properties of K (Fact 34) in exchange for a system (K uf , K with universal falsum) that is essentially equivalent to semantic embedding in rst-order logic (Theorem 36). Finally, in Section 4.3 we investigate the properties of K lf (K with local falsum), the base logic we get by restricting ?E in K so that all references are local to one world. Here, unlike in K, we cannot propagate ? freely from one world to another (Proposition 38). We argue that though certain modal logics can be formalized in extensions of K lf , the system lacks basic properties, such as duality between 2 and 3 (Proposition 40) or normal form derivations (Proposition 42), which we might look for in a`good' formalization.
Global Falsum
We begin by observing that in K, and therefore in K + T , ? (1) and (2) . We show that any application of ?E with a non-atomic consequence can be replaced with a derivation in which ?E is applied only to lw s of smaller degree. By Proposition 24, there are two possible cases, depending on whether the conclusion is x:A ! B or x:2A. An immediate consequence of this is the equivalence of the restricted and the unrestricted ND system. We will therefore refer to both of them as K. De nition 26 Any lw x:A in a derivation is the root of a tree of rule applications leading back to assumptions. The lw s in this tree other than x:A we call side lw s of x:A in the derivation. A maximal lw in a derivation is an lw that is both the conclusion of an introduction rule and the major premise of an elimination rule. A maximal lw can be removed from a derivation by a reduction step. Two possible con gurations (for ! and 2) result in a maximal lw in a derivation. They, and their corresponding reduction steps are:
x 
where z=y] is obtained from by systematically substituting z for y, with a suitable renaming of the variables to avoid clashes. Note that we only show the part of the derivation where the reduction actually takes place; the missing parts remain unchanged.
De nition 27 A derivation is in normal form (is a normal derivation) if it contains no maximal lw s.
Theorem 28 Every derivation of x:A from ?; in K reduces to a derivation in normal form.
Proof If is a derivation of x:A from ?; in K, then from the set of maximal lw s of pick some y:B which has the highest degree and has maximal lw s only of lower degree as side lw s. Let 0 be the reduction of at y:B. 0 is also a derivation of x:A from ?; in K and no new maximal lw as large, or larger than y:B has been introduced. Hence, by a nite number of similar reductions we obtain a derivation of x:A from ?; in K containing no maximal lw s.
Since derivations in a Horn relational theory T H cannot introduce maximal lw s (and all the rw s are of the form x R y), by minor modi cations to the above, e.g. substitute We will sometimes speak loosely of y:B being a subformula of x:A, meaning B is a subformula of A.
In other words, analogous to 18], we de ne ?; `x:A to have the subformula property i for all y:B in the derivation, either B is a subformula of the assumptions or the conclusion of the derivation, or B is the negation of such a subformula and is discharged by ?E, or B is an occurrence of ? immediately below the negation of a subformula.
Fact 31 If is a normal derivation of x:A from ?; in K or K+T H , then satis es the subformula property. So far, we have considered extensions of K with Horn relational theories. There is, however, no reason why we should not have relational theories that make use of an arbitrary logic. We just have to extend the language and add appropriate rules and axioms. However, irrespective of which logic we allow in the labelling algebra, the rules of K dictate that the only way that derivations there can contribute to lw derivations is via propositions of the form x R y, thus our normalization theorem for K in fact extends to K extended with an arbitrary relational theory T . To summarize, This enforced separation between the base logic and the labelling algebra is in the philosophical spirit of LDSs, and it also provides extra structure that is pragmatically useful: since derivations of rw s use only the resources of the labelling algebra, we may be able to employ theory speci c reasoners successfully to automate proof construction. However, in exchange for this extra structure there are limits to the generality of the formulation.
Consider an extension of the labelling algebra to a full rst-order theory. To keep distinct the syntax of the base logic from the labelling algebra, we will use connectives from boolean logic | ; (falsum), (implies), 8 | to build relational formulae in the labelling algebra; as notation, we henceforth assume that the possibly subscripted variable ranges over such formulae. First-order properties of R are now added as axioms (or rules) directly in their full form, and the rst-order relational theory T F is obtained by extending ND R (the rst-order ND system of R) with a collection C R of such axioms. For example, for restricted (i; j; m; n) convergency and for irre exivity we add:
The rules of ND R are given in Figure 4 ; formulae over other connectives (e.g. (not), \ (and), (or), 9) and corresponding rules are de ned as usual, and we will explicitly use them in the following. We have:
Theorem 33 There are modal logics corresponding to Kripke frames with accessi- :E y:A ?E 4 where R is a derivation purely in the relational theory ND R + C. But x R y; x R z 6 y R z in ND R + C, so K + ND R + C cannot prove the characteristic axiom for the frames de ned by C, i.e. K + ND R + C is not complete with respect to the semantics.
Clearly, if R were also symmetric, then x R y; x R z`y R z. Hence, this particular counter-example to completeness does not hold for extensions of the logic KB, for which, however, other counter-examples can be found. Note also that incompleteness can be shown by means of other modal formulae, but the provability of the corresponding modal axiom is philosophically the rst requirement to be ful lled by the addition of a relational rule. For instance, by similar reasoning, we can show that x:2A ! 3A does not follow from K + ND R + f8x9y(x R y)g.
Universal Falsum
The reason for the incompleteness of K + T F in the proof of Theorem 33 is easy to identify; we could imagine replacing R above with since we can show that x R y; x R z; y R z ;`z R y in ND R + C.
What we need is some rule ? to allow us to propagate falsum not only between worlds, like gf, but also between the base logic and the relational theory; i.e. collapsing x:? and ; together. We can add rules x:? ; uf 1 ; x:? uf 2 to K to get the system K uf which has what we call a universal falsum. Clearly with universal falsum we lose the separation between the two theories described in Fact 32.
Fact 34 In the logic K uf (and, a fortiori, in K uf + T F ) the two parts of the proof system are not separated: lw judgements can depend on rw judgements, and vice versa. In fact, we can show that K uf +T F , unlike K+T , is essentially equivalent to the usual semantic embedding of modal logics in rst-order logic. Proof Since reasoning about labels is directly translated, we only treat the case when ' in an lw . Left to right is simple, since we can nd derived rules in rst-order logic corresponding to each rule of K uf . For instance, for 2I we proceed as follows (The eigenvariable condition for 8I holds since it holds for 2I). The other direction is trickier. However, we know that derivations in rst-order logic have expanded normal forms 19], thus we can assume is a normal derivation of C R ; (?) ; ( ) `(x:A) , and observe that it is possible to translate this derivation directly into K uf +ND R +C R ; e.g. if we reverse ; in (5), we can see that since a normal derivation of (x:2A) must have exactly the form (the sequence of introduction rules) given there, and, by induction, the same translation can be performed on the subderivation of (y:A) from (x R y) , it is possible to translate this into a derivation in K uf + ND R + C R . We can do the same with the other rules. All we have to do is, occasionally, insert extra rules translating between falsum for rw s and falsum for lw s. Under the assumption (cf., for instance, 14]) that semantic embedding in rst-order logic is sound and complete with respect to the appropriate Kripke semantics, we have that:
Corollary 37 K uf + T F is sound and complete.
Local Falsum
In the rules of K, rw s interact with lw s through the 2E rule and this changes the label of the major premise. But this is not the only rule which changes worlds; ?E, as we have discussed, also has this property. To complete our investigation of alternative formulations, we consider the other end of the spectrum from universal falsum where, by restricting ?E, falsum is local and cannot move arbitrarily between worlds:
x:A ! ?]
. . . . x:?
x:A ?E lf Call K lf the system obtained from K by replacing ?E with its restricted form ?E lf . Note that in K lf we can propagate ? forwards indirectly: given x:? we have x:2?, and thus y:? when x R y; i.e.
x:?
x:2? ?E lf x R y y:? 2E
But we cannot propagate ? to an arbitrary world: Proposition 38 There is no derivation of y:? from x:? in K lf .
To show this we prove:
Lemma 39 If there are no applications of ?E in a derivation in K then normalization of the derivation cannot introduce one.
Proof By examining the transformations involved in reducing a derivation to normal form.
Proof (of Proposition 38) Since K lf is a fragment of K, a derivation of y:? from x:? in K lf would have a normal form 0 in K. Since any such derivation needs to make use of ?E, which, by Lemma 39, must already be present in the un-normalized form of , no such derivation can exist in K lf .
In the same way, we can prove that, since gf is not derivable, Proposition 24 fails for K lf .
Proposition 40 The connectives 2 and 3 are not interde nable in K lf .
We need:
Lemma 41 A normal form derived rule in K suitable for the substitution (1) Proof By examination of the possible normal derivations. Proof (of Proposition 40) Consider case (1) in the proof of Proposition 24. Assume is a suitable derivation in K lf , then, since is also a derivation in K, it has a normal form 0 in K. However, by Lemmata 39 and 41 such a derivation in K lf does not exist, since 0 , and thus , must contain unrestricted applications of ?E.
Proposition 40 shows that K lf is not in general suitable for formalizing modal logics, since we are not able to propagate falsum to inaccessible worlds. However it is easy to show that in fact we only ever have to deal with worlds accessible in some way from each other. Given, as we have observed, that we can propagate ? forwards in K lf , if R is symmetrical we also have a backwards propagation:
x:2? ?E lf y R x x R y symm y:? 2E
Thus K lf can be used to formalize certain logics after a fashion (if the relational theory T F is inconsistent or if R is universal, so that x R y for all x; y, then we get this much more simply). 8 However the resulting formalization is fundamentally unsatisfactory, since it lacks important metatheoretic properties that we get in K; namely, we have:
Proposition 42 Derivations in K lf do not have normal forms satisfying the subformula property.
Proof As we observed in (6), there is a derivation of y:? from x R y and x:? in K lf .
However, there cannot be a normal one satisfying the subformula property (x:2? is not a subformula in (6)). We have used the Isabelle system 17] to implement and interactively construct derivations with the modal logics we presented. The logical basis of Isabelle is a natural deduction presentation of minimal implicational predicate logic with universal quanti cation over all higher-types 16]. 9 We call this metalogic M; to prevent object/meta confusion we use to represent Isabelle's universal quanti er and ) for implication.
An object logic is encoded in Isabelle by declaring a theory, which consists of a signature and axioms, which are formulae in the language of M. The axioms are used to establish the validity of judgements, which are assertions about syntactic objects declared in the signature 12]. Derivations are constructed by deduction in the metalogic.
In our work, we declare a theory M K , which encodes K. The signature of M K declares two types label and o, which denote labels and unlabelled modal formulae, respectively. Connectives and modal operators are declared as typed constants over this signature, i.e. box of type o ) o. There are two judgements, which correspond to predicate symbols in the metalogic: L and A, which stand for`Labelled Formula' and`Accessibility'. L(x; A) and A(x; y) respectively express the judgements that x:A is a provable lw and that x R y is a provable rw . The axioms for L are a direct axiomatization of the rules in Figure 1 . Theories in Isabelle correspond to instances of an abstract datatype in the ML programming language and Isabelle provides means for creating elements of these types, extending them, and combining them. We use these facilities to combine and extend our modal theories. This is best illustrated by an example. KT is obtained by extending K with the axiom refl; this is speci ed as follows.
Again, recall that outermost quanti ers are left implicit, so the above is shorthand for adding !!x. x R x as an axiom to K. Similarly, K4 is formed by extending K with trans. K4 = K + rules trans "x R y ==> y R z ==> x R z" end
We may now obtain KT4, i.e. S4, by similarly extending KT (or K4 or K). Alternatively, we may apply the ML-function merge_theories to KT 
In the appendix, we show how these theorems are interactively proved in Isabelle in their corresponding theories and then applied to conclude: . . . . In the appendix we use this theory to prove x:32A ! 23A, (see the proof in Section 2.4), which is the characteristic axiom of K2. The examples we work through in Isabelle should help convince the reader that the approach we have taken to interactive theorem proving for modal logics is both simple and exible. In particular, it supports the hierarchical structuring of theories and inheritance of theorems between them.
Correctness
When one logic encodes another, correctness of the encoding must be shown. Theorem 46 M L is faithful and adequate.
Related Work
Our work combines an LDS presentation of modal logics with a logical framework to provide a natural deduction presentation of modal logics in a uniform way based on their semantics. Here we compare this with related work in natural deduction, Labelled Deductive Systems, and semantic embedding.
Natural Deduction
Prawitz 18] discusses a rule for necessitation (2) introduction in S4 and S5 with thè non-local' side condition that all the supporting assumptions are modal (i.e. the main connective is 2), in the case of S4, or modal formulae and their negation, in the case of S5. However, such a rule cannot be formalized by a pure proof rule, i.e. one that may be applied in any context of assumptions; hence it cannot be directly encoded within a logical framework. A solution to this problem is given, as mentioned earlier, in 2, x4.4], where the proof system is factored into two ordinary pure single-conclusioned consequence relations. Unfortunately, the result is far removed from the standard presentations based on accessibility relations or characteristic axioms. Also there is no attempt to modularize structure or correctness: only a particular modal logic is analyzed and it is not apparent how to generalize the results in a uniform way.
Another approach to the formalization of`non-local' conditions in a logical framework is to manage assumptions explicitly with sequents, e.g. 9, 26] . The Isabelle system distribution contains such an encoding due to Martin Coen which uses several auxiliary judgements to give complex encodings of T, S4, and S4:3. Similar problems would result from trying to formalize directly the kind of pre xed tableaux systems suggested, for example, by Fitting 9 ].
Labelled Deductive Systems
Our work is inspired by the LDS approach proposed by Gabbay, and further developed for modal logics, in parallel with our work, by Russo 20] . Gabbay introduces LDSs as a general and unifying methodology for presenting almost any logic 10]. To support this generality his LDS metatheory and presentations are based on a notion of diagrams and logic data-bases, which are manipulated by rules with multiple premises and conclusions. For example 10, p.57] presents the rule for 3E as s:3B create r, s < r and r:B the application of which updates a modal data-base with the two new conclusions (a rule to the same e ect is given in 20]). The formal details are quite di erent from our proposal, where the rule for 3E given in Figure 1 is represented in the metalevel of Isabelle by the following axiom, which directly formalizes a natural deduction rule:
x z A B(L(x; 3A) ) ( y(L(y; A) ) A(x; y)) ) L(z; B)) ) L(z; B)) :
There is another di erence between our work and theirs that is worth emphasizing. In our work, we have identi ed an important property of the structured presentation of logics, their combination, and extension. Namely, there is tension between modularity and extensibility: a narrow interface between the base logic and labelling algebra provides a better (more modular) metatheory, but limits extensions to the labelling algebra. In our approach, the use of a metalogic with di erent judgements serves to separate the base logic and the labelling algebra. This separation is critical: it is only when we attempt to modularize and separate these two theories formally and de ne a precise interface between them that we see that only limited modularity (i.e. there are limits to the relational theories) is actually possible.
Of course, in implementing particular LDSs Gabbay and Russo could similarly separate theories. The precise nature of this would be re ected in the rules they choose for propagating results between data-bases. It should be the case that if their rules enforce a similar separation, then they will encounter similar limitations to those reported here. That is, the problems we identify have some generality and should appear in other frameworks where theories are separated and results are communicated in a limited way between them.
The kind of labelled natural deduction encoding we employ is closest to the work of Simpson 22] . However his focus, proof techniques, and applications are based on using LDSs to investigate intuitionistic versions of modal logics, and his correctness considerations are quite di erent. Moreover, his relations have no independent theory with which one can work.
Note that the universal falsum approach is adopted explicitly in 20]. Simpson's approach is di erent, and di cult to compare: he treats rw s only as assumptions in inferences of lw s via his`geometric' rules, which are derivable in our systems. An example of an approach in which, like with local falsum, local inconsistency does not imply global inconsistency, is the work of Giunchiglia and Sera ni 11], who show that particular`multicontext systems', where (indexed) formulae are translated between contexts using`bridge rules', de ne the same classes of provable formulae as certain standard modal logics. However their approach is, in general, radically di erent from ours, and not comparable.
Translation and Semantic Embedding
We conclude by mentioning work on translating modal logics into rst-order logic, e.g. 14, 15]. As sketched in De nition 35, these approaches typically label all subformulae with worlds and combine the modal and relational theory in a theory suitable for standard rst-order provers. The emphasis is on automatic, but not necessarilỳ natural', theorem proving. Moreover, by design, there is no separation between the relational theory, any kind of base modal theory, and rst-order logic itself; i.e. there is precisely one falsum from which one can conclude arbitrary relational or labelled formulae.
Conclusions
We have given a modular presentation and correctness proofs for the implementation of a large and well-known class of propositional modal logics in the Isabelle logical framework. Our approach is based on relational theories comprised of (Horn clause) axioms formalizing the accessibility of worlds in Kripke frames. It demonstrates, we think, that they t particularly well into the logical framework setting, capture a large class of standardly considered propositional modal logics, and have pleasant metatheoretic properties (e.g. one can use induction on their structure to show faithfulness and adequacy across an in nite set of extensions). We have used similar techniques to present quanti ed modal logics in a companion paper 4].
Our work has also identi ed an important property of the structured presentation of logics, their combination, and extension. Namely, there is tension between modularity and extensibility: a narrow interface between the base logic and labelling algebra can limit the degree to which we can make use of extensions to the labelling algebra. As a consequence, there are important design decisions in implementing Rules represent proof states where A is the goal to be established and the Ai are the subgoals to be proved. Under this view, an initial proof state has the form A ==> A, i.e. it has one subgoal, namely A. The nal proof state is itself the desired theorem. Isabelle supports proof construction through higher-order resolution, which is roughly analogous to resolution in Prolog. That is, given a proof state with subgoal B and a rule as above, then (treating the vi as variables for uni cation) we higher-order unify A with B. If this succeeds, then the uni cation yields a substitution s and the proof state is updated replacing B with the subgoals s(A1),...,s(An). This resolution step can be justi ed by a sequence of proof steps in the metalogic. Although rules are formalized in a natural deduction style, they may be read as intuitionistic sequents where the Ai are the hypotheses. Isabelle has procedures which apply rules in a way that maintains this`illusion' of working with sequents.
